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I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of the defaulter's part performance interest is fundamental in that it brings into conflict basic doctrines underlying the
Anglo-American legal system. It pits contracts against restitution, condition precedent against unjust enrichment, sanctity of the legally binding promise against legal abhorrence of the unnecessary forfeiture.
The problem is basically one of evaluating conflicting interests. Few
questions that have occurred so frequently and have such practical importance have at the same time created such diversity of views and have
become so difficult of adequate solution.'
Text writers, beginning with Woodward, 2 divide the subject as to
the type of contract performance involved. Four classifications have
been established: the service contract, construction contract, contract
for the sale of goods, and contract for the payment of money. The first
of these classifications, the iervice contract, is to be considered in this
article. Keener 3 classifies the problem on the basis of default causation,
i.e., where the default is wilful or inexcusable, or performance is impossible or illegal.
Consideration will be given primarily to the "wilful" default and to
contracts both valid and voidable. Distinction is drawn between the
employment contract calling for the creation of an end unit product and
the service-employment contract providing for continued employment
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to recover compensation for services rendered in part performance of an
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for a given period, sometimes called the term-employment contract.
Personal service of the employee is of prime importance in the latter
classification. The relationship between employer and employee is best
classified under the old common law terminology of master and servant,
although the term today does not carry the same connotation as in
earlier days. The servant can properly be defined as one who is employed to render personal service to his employer, other than in the
pursuit of an independent calling, and who in such services remains
entirely under the control and direction of the employer, denoted his
master.4
Distinction must also be drawn between contracts for services and
those for work and labor. Where one party employs another to do
work, the contract may be one or the other. If the employer during the
progress of the work not only directs the employees as to the work to
be done, but also controls the manner of performance, the contract is
for services. If the employee exercises his employment independently
of his employer, the contract is for work and labor. The present article
is limited to a consideration of the service contract.
Within this framework is included a large number of judicial decisions wherein the employee abandons performance after having conferred sufficient benefit in the form of partial performance of the service contract so as to exceed the probable monetary damage caused the
employer by the employee's breach. When the employee defaults, part
of the conferred performance equal to the monetary damages suffered
must be sacrificed by the employee. The employee should never be permitted intentionally to breach his valid service contract and still receive
full compensation for his completed performance regardless of the
damage caused the employer by the default. The controversy has never
involved this portion of the employee's performance. Damages resulting from the breach are granted whether the employer initiate the suit
or set up damages as a defense to the defaulting employee's suit. The
issue that has caused such controversy is whether the employee should
have any interest in the value of the executed part performance that
exceeds the amount of monetary damages caused by his voluntarily
abandoning performance. This distinction between damage-part-performance, and excess-benefit part-performance has repeatedly been
made in text commentaries and law review ariticles. Many of the earlier
decisions, however, failed to comprehend this distinction fully and refused to allow recovery to the defaulter. The part performance interest
was not separated into its two distinct components, and, as a result, unjust enrichment of the employer was not considered.
Fault causation of the employee's breach has influenced the court in
4
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its attitude toward the partial performance interest in direct relation to
the extent that the reason for breach can be placed upon the employee.
Judicial opinion began to relax when.fault causation could not be placed
upon either employer or employee, e.g., because of impossibility or
frustration of purpose, or had to be equally placed upon both, e.g., because of illegality or mutual mistake. It became inevitable that the conflict would have to be evaluated and determined at the level of the intentional default. Although there has been considerable appellate litigation at the intentional default level, the problem has had a turbulent
history, gradually changing with the change in the employer- employee
relationship. An understanding of the judicial attitude toward the employee's performance interest necessitates an understanding of the
social attitude and general legal position of the employee prior to the
time that the present problem was first considered in reported judicial
decision.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The judicial history of the defaulting employee in the contract for a
definite term is a relatively short one, beginning in England and the
United States early in the nineteenth century. A proper evaluation of
these early decisions requires an understanding of the socio-economic
relationship between master and servant during the preceding century.
The dearth of appellate judicial opinion during the eighteenth century does not stem from the fact that there was greater probability of
the employee completing his promised performance than his fellowemployee of the subsequent century. The probable influence was the
social attitude toward the master-servant relationship during this period
and a corresponding reluctance on the part of the employee to test his
claim for benefit conferred.
Adam Smith expressed the view that the common law of England
during the eighteenth century discriminated against the employee.5
Holdsworth disputes this point, yet agrees that there was legislative discrimination. 6
A series of statutes were passed during the eighteenth century to
suppress combinations or alliances of men in specified trades. In 1720,
combinations of journeymen tailors in London who sought unity in
order to advance their wages or lessen their usual hours of work were
declared illegal by statute and were punishable by imprisonment. Hours
of work and rates of wages were set and fixed; power was alloted to
quarter sessions to alter the rate of wages and the hours of work; and,
finally, penalties were prescribed for master or servant who gave or
received higher wages than specified.7 Imprisonment for combinations
1

5 SMrrH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 143-4.
6 11 HOLDSWoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

7 7 George I St. 1.c. 13, §1.

488 (1938).
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was extended to trades of wool combers, weavers, framework knitters
and stocking-makers; penalties were imposed for spoiling work, threatening a masters and for terminating work in breach of contract.9 There
was little inducement which would encourage an employee attempting to
litigate a claim for the value of his part performance in excess of
damages caused by the breach. In 1749, legislative enactment extended
the scope of the above statutes to include a large variety of additional
industries, with added provisions dealing with assorted abuses and
frauds comitted by workmen in these industries. 10 Statutes were enacted in 1777 against associated journeymen hatters, including penalties
for stopping work in breach of contract.1"
Aimed at specific trades, the purpose of these numerous enactments
was less to regulate employees and more to suppress combinations of
various tradesmen. The climate of legislative regulation in England,
nevertheless, was altering. With the spread of the capitalistic organization of industry and the growing prevalence of the factory system, the
economic thesis that the state should interfere minimally with industrial
relations gathers force. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, published in
1776, advocated liberty of the individual and the belief that the end
result would be economic improvement. The wealth of a nation could
best be attained by allowing freedom to each individual to pursue his
trade rather than restrictive legislation designed to secure prosperity.
Laissez-faire, and the working of natural economic laws, would do the
rest. Smith criticized all commercial and industrial laws of his day. The
manufacturers of England at this time controlled the legislature
and strove to abolish all regulations governing the relations between
master and servant. The manufacturer sought freedom to conduct his
business as he pleased. He saw any attempt to regulate wages as ill
advised, impossible of success and as an attempt to alter one of nature's
physical laws.1 2 In such a climate, it became apparent to the working
classes that appeals to Parliament were useless. Petitions to secure a
living wage and fair industrial conditions were rejected. Recourse to
the courts provided no encouragement. In 1802, the weavers of the
West of England combined with the Yorkshire weavers and appointed
an attorney to prosecute employers who infringed the trade laws. The
courts were asked to enforce their rights based upon then existing
statutes. Upon the initiation of this suit, Parliament hastily passed an
Act suspending the statute upon which the weavers relied. The Act was3
passed to put an end to the prosecution of the weavers' employers.'
812 George I c. 34, §§1,6,8.
9 Ibid. §2.
10 22 George II c. 27, §§1,2,7,12.
11 17 George III c. 55, §3.

12 11 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

13 Ibid. 499, Note 2;
INDUSTRY AND

499 (1938).

WEBD, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM 57-60; 3
COMMERCE 635-6.
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Denied assistance from either Parliament or the English courts, the
characteristic law abiding instinct of the English during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries began to diminish in the laboring class, and
alliance of workers seeming to protect their own interests became more
common. There was almost a complete abandonment of any attempt to
bring the relations of master and servant under any effective legal control. Disputes arising between master and servant were withdrawn from
the arbitrations of the law and instead settled by the effective forces at
the disposal of the contending parties. The laissez-faire attitude of
Parliament resulted in violation by the working man of statutes against
combinations, and these violations in turn prompted Parliament to enact
even sterner combination statutes. Finally in 179914 and 1800,1s the
first "general combination" acts were passed. These were fundamentally
the same as the earlier 18th century combination acts, making all contracts between workmen entered into for the purpose of obtaining advanced wages, or decreased hours of work, or regulation of the quantity
of work, illegal. The formation of such a contract was a criminal
offense punishable with imprisonment. The basic difference, however,
is that these statutes governed the entire working class in England,
while the earlier combination acts related only to specific trades. These
combination acts on paper were applicable to both master and workingman alike, but were never interpreted by the magistrates as applicable
to the master. The masters combined freely, and in no single instance
were they punished. The disdainful attitude of the employer toward
his workers was surpassed only by that of the magistrate who refused
to enforce legislation that was obnoxious to the masters. This flaunting
of the law is evidenced by the frank admissions of the magistrates,
who, for the most part, preferred to presume that if the master would
not obey the law, nothing could be done to enforce obedience. Hammond16 even cites examples wherein, the law having been violated by
the master, the employee was sent to prison by the magistrate because
of over-insistence that the magistrate enforce the law against his employer.
In addition to the "combination acts" which were predominantly
eighteenth century enactments, there also existed a second set of enactments that were enforced during the eighteenth century, but which had
been in effect since a much earlier date, and were directed specifically
at the regulation of the working class.
The earliest of these is the Statute of Labourers, passed in 1349, the
direct consequence of the Black Death of the same year. The Black
Death had wiped out over half of the population of England, hence the
14 39 George III c.81.

Is 39, 40 George III c. 106.
16 HAMMOND, THE TOWN LABOURER, 1760-1832 66-7 (1920).
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Landlords could secure neither tenants nor labor, and masters could not
obtain artificers. Laborers of all classifications found themselves in a
position to exact the wages they demanded. To alleviate this situation,
the Statute of Labourers was passed containing the following basic
principles: (1) all persons covered by the statute (and this included
many types of laborers and workmen) and able to work, must do so;
(2) these must work at a reasonable rate; (3) failure to accept a reasonable rate of pay was a criminal offense and a writ of trespass partaking both of civil and criminal character could be taken against a servant
who left his master's service, as well as against the person who enticed
him away. 17 The old order, before the Black Death, based upon customs and by-laws of manors, borroughs and guilds, viewed the relationship of master and servant as a status and regulated in accordingly.
This old order was rapidly melting away and the fourteenth century
legislature, in enacting the Statute of Labourers, acknowledged that the
relationship between master and servant had changed to one of contractual agreement. It was desired, however, that the relationship should
preserve some of the characteristics of former status. This was indicated by the statutes themselves and by the manner in which they
were interpreted by the courts. 8 An agreement by a workman to serve
his employer was an executory contract and was unenforceable before
the growth of the action of assumpsit at common law. However, when
such contract was coupled with a parol retainer by the employer which
complied with statutory requirements, the employment contract was enforceable against even an infant. The retainer under the statutes differed from ordinary contracts in that it gave to the master remedies for
breach of contract that were absolutely different from those available
in the case of any other contract. By use of the retainer he could use
force to capture the servant who departed or who, having been retained, never entered the service. In addition, the retainer gave him
rights against other masters who persuaded the servant to depart, or
did not give him up when required to do so. The employment contract
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can be compared to the marriage contract in that both were contractual in origin, but the agreement created a status of a particular kind. The rights and duties in both
cases were fixed to a large extent by law rather than by the agreement
of the parties. Both Putman and Holdsworth 9 feel that both the legis17 Register if,
189, 190 and 23 Edward III, c.2.
18

PUTMAN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF

THE STATUTES
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2. In the proceedings before the central courts, cases turning on breach of
contract by the servant, or on procurring breach of contract by another were
most frequent.

19 Ibid.; 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 462 note 1; p. 463; "It was
felt and felt wisely that the progress from status to contract could not be
made at one bound." At p. 471,

".

.

. it will be clear that the view taken by

the medieval state as to the proper relationship of the law to trade was so
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lative view in enacting and the judicial attitude in interpreting these
statutes in such manner as to carry forward into the employent contract
many of the incidents of villeinage status were reasonable both for the
fourteenth century and long thereafter.
A span of two hundred years following passage of the Statute of
Labourers in 1349 saw little change in the legal position of the laborer.
During the Tudor period there were some changes, but they were primarily modifications of details in the medieval statutes.20 In 1562-3 the
whole legislation was reconsidered, and the Statute of Apprentices of
Artificers was passed. 21 It held that all persons within certain categories defined by the Statute and able to work must do so. But if the
workman were not free to decline to serve, then the employer was not
wholly free to dismiss him as he pleased. The worker's wages were
also established, and he was not permitted more than a reasonable rate
of wages. At this early date the reasonableness of wages was detervaried based upon a slidmined by the price of necessaries. Wage rates
22
ing scale related to the price of necessaries.
The above Act, passed during the period of Elizabeth's reign, also
prescribed that in a large number of specified employments the hiring
must be for one year, and that a quarter's notice must be given to terminate the contract. 23 It has been suggested that it was this provision
which gave rise to the presumption existing at one time that an indefinite hiring was a yearly hiring.2 4 Just as it had been under the
earlier acts, it was an offense for the laborer to depart wrongfully
or to refrom his employment, refuse to work at the statutory rates,
25
statute.
the
by
prescribed
those
of
excess
in
wages
ceive
To Webb26 the intolerable oppression which these laws enabled unscrupulous employers to commit were, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, scarcely inferior to that brought about by the combination laws:
"If an employer broke a contract of service even wilfully and
without excuse he was liable only to be sued for damages, or in
the case of wages under £ 10 to be summoned before a court of
summary jurisdiction, which could order payment of the amount
due. The workman, on the other hand, who wilfully broke his
different from the view of the modem state that we cannot expect to find
much medieval authority upon the legal problems of our own times."
2011 Henry VII, c. 22 repealed by 12 Henry VII c. 3, 4. Henry VIII c. 5; 6
Henry VIII c. 3; 7 Henry VII c. 5.
21 5 Eliz. c. 4 (1563).
22 Boke of Justyces of 1510; New Boke of 1538; 13 Ric.II st. 1. 1. 8; 1 James
I, c. 6; 4 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 382.
23 5 Eliz. c. 4, §§2 and 4.
24 COKE oN Lirr. §42b; Fawcett v. Cash, 5 B. & A. 904 (1834); 4 HoLmswolrH,
T-TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 383, note 1.
25
5 Eliz. c. 4, §§4, 6, 13. (1563).
26
WEBi,
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contract of service either by absenting himself from his employment, or by leaving his work, was liable to be proceeded against
for a criminal offence and punished by three months imprisonment. This inequality of treatment was moreover aggravated by
various other anomalies. It followed by the general law of evidence that while a master sued by a servant could be witness in
his own favor, the servant prosecuted by his employer could not
give evidence on his own behalf, and it frequently happened that
no other evidence than the employer's could be produced. It was
in the power of a single justice of the peace on an information
on oath, to issue a warrant for the summary arrest of the workman, who thus found himself when a dispute occurred suddenly
seized, even in his bed, and hailed to prison at the discretion of
the magistrate, who was himself in many cases an employer of
labor in addition to being magistrate. The case was heard before
a single justice of the peace and might take place at his private
house. The only punishment that could be inflicted was imprisonment, the law not allowing alternatives of a fine or the
payment of damages. From the decision of the justice, however
arbitrary, there was no appeal. The sentence of imprisonment
was not a discharge of the debt, so the workman was liable to be
imprisoned
over and over again for the same breach of con2
tract."1
7
Holdsworth maintains that such criticism of the Elizabethan legislation and judiciary is unfair in that the critic assesses the manner in
which the laws of the seventeenth and eighteenth century affected the
workman, without evaluating the effect of these laws upon the employer. He concedes the difference in remedy applied when the employee rather than the employer breached the contract, but justifies the
difference on the ground that it was to the interest of the State that the
contracts be kept, and further that a pecuniary penalty and civil action
for damages were useless remedies against a man with no estate. Other
more effective remedies for performance of the contract, including
forced imprisonment, had to be provided. "The poor man because he is
poor cannot be allowed to break his contract as he pleases" 28 . . . "I consider, therefore, that the legislation of this period on the subject of employer and workman was a well thought out scheme, logically connected with the legislation on the cognate subjects of the food supply
and prices." 29 Although the employee was legally free to contract, his
bargaining power was ineffective. Market forces, custom, public opinion, collective bargaining and legislation played far more important
roles than personal negotiation in dictating contract terms. By the time
of the establishment of the free labor contract in England, the legally
liberated worker, who was forbidden to combine with his fellows, often
had to face an employer with whose economic power he could not cope.
27 Ibid., at 249.
28 4 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
29 Ibid.,

at 387.

386.
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The worker simply offered his labor, which must be sold both because
it was highly perishable and because he had no other means of existence. The employer possessed capital that was more lasting and that
increased his power of resistance, and he generally had an oversupply
of workers from which to choose.30 In the eighteenth century, empirical
individualism became rational with Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations,
and the businessman's subconscious ideal of laisse-faire became ar3
ticulate as a concrete economic philosophy. 1
Blackstone, lecturing at Oxford in 1753, set forth his four classifications of servants. As to the menial or domestic servant he relied on
Coke32 and natural justice3 3 for his view that if the servant's hiring is
general, without any particular time limit, the law should construe the
contract as a hiring for a year. So construed, the employee must work
the entire year or collect nothing. Regarding the laborer hired by the
day or week who does not live as part of the employer's family, Blackstone expressed the view that the statute of Elizabeth (5 Eliz. c. 4 and
Geo. III c.26) "have many very good regulations" including the provisions punishing those who leave or desert their prescribed work.3 4
He granted that the apprentice system, whereby the trade laborer must
serve seven years as an apprentice before he had an exclusive right to
exercise his trade in England, had been looked upon as both a hard and
and as a beneficial law. At the time Blackstone wrote, several attempts
had already been made to repeal the apprenticeship law, but success did
35
not come until 1814, after Blackstone's death.
Schoulder, referring to Blackstone as authority, points out that
while fines and imprisonment were the punishment of the employed, the
employer suffered rarely for his own misconduct beyond rescission of
3
the contract a
III. EIGHTEENTR CENTURY JUDIcIAL DECISIONS

The early English cases are related to the growth of assumpsit.
The branches of special and indebitatus assumpsit became distinct in the
course of the seventeenth century, and practical consequences were
30 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
31

630 (1937).

Morrow, Warranty of Quality, A Comparative Survey, 14 TULANE L. REV.,

327, 330 (1939); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE
L. J. 1133, 1171.
32 COKE ON Lrrr. 42.
33 1 BLACI<STONE, CoMmENTARIES. §424, ch. 14.
34

Ibid., §426.

•'I Ibid., §428; Stat. 54, Geo. III c. 96; The introduction of machinery in the new
manufacturing industries which were outside the scope of the apprentice laws,
the growing dislike of all restrictions under freedom of trade, and the rise
of capitalism led to the repeal in 1814 of the important parts of the statute
of 1563. A man might now exercise any craft or trade he pleased, whether
he had been an apprentice or not. The Act of 1814 marked the end of compulsory apprenticeship, and, although it was not appreciated at the time, of
domestic apprenticeship also.
3.5a SCHOULDER, DOMESTIC RE.ATIONS §456, p. 692 (4th ed. 1889).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

drawn from these differences. In 1696, it had been held that indebitatus
assumpsit would not lie on an executory contract where a promise was
consideration for a promise.36 The action would lie only where a debt
had been created. Thus, alleging and proving performance was essential
where performance by one party was a condition precedent to payment
by the other. Neither debt nor indebitatus assumpsit were available because the debt had not been incurred. This led to the famous case of
Countess of Plymouth v. Throgmorton,3 7 in 1688, an employment for
the collection of rents in exchange for a promise to pay £ 100 a year.
The employer died after there had been performance for three quarters
of a year, and it was held that there could be no recovery from the
deceased's executor by action of debt. He could only have recovered
the value of his services if the testator had wrongfully broken the contract. An implied promise was necessary for recovery, and this could
not be created by judicial decision as long as the special contract remained in existence.The principal eighteenth century case involving partial performance
of a service contract is Cutler v. Powell.39 Defendant promised payment of thirty guineas to a seaman if he "proceeded, continued and did
his duty" as second mate on a voyage from Jamaica to Liverpool. The
sailor died on the voyage, and it was held that his representative could
not recover on a quantum meruit. By this time, at the close of the
eighteenth century, Lord Kenyon, in discussing the rule that where the
parties have come to an express contractual agreement none can be implied, commented that "it has prevailed so long as to be reduced to an
axiom in the law."' 40 Although Cutler v. Powell influenced the early
American service contract default decisions, it should be distinguished
in that it, as well as the earlier Countess of Plymouth decision, dealt
with impossibility of performance resulting from death, rather than intentional breach of performance. Cutler v. Powell is also, basically, an
aleatory contract 4' with assumed risk of failure to perform. This distinction, however, was often overlooked by the early American decisions dealing with intentional default of the employee. Emphasis was
placed on similarities rather than fundamental distinctions.
IV. EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The precise issue of the term employee's partial performance interest, when the contract default resulted from abandonment of persaBivey v. Castleman, 1 Ld. Rayn. 69; Smith v. Aiery, 6 Mod. 128 (1705); 3
HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 446-7; see also Vol. 8, p. 75.
3 1 Salk. 65, 91 Eng. Rep. 61.
n Weston v.Downes, 1 Dougl. 23 (1778).
39 6 T.R.320 (1795).
40 Ibid., at 324.
41 The thirty guineas salary for the voyage was considerably more than the
average seaman's pay for a similar voyage. The excessive offer would not
have been made without an understanding as to risk assumption.
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formance, first arose shortly after the beginning of the nineteenth century. The initial group of cases originated within the state of New
York. The initial case of M'Millian v. Vanderlip4 2 in 1815 involved
employment in a spinning mill. Justice Spencer found the contract
entire by refusing to recognize divisibility based on pay by the completed run and based his decision on the English case of Waddington
v. Oliver,43 involving the sale of goods rather than a service employment contract. To Justice Spencer, "the rule contended for held out
temptations to men to violate their contracts." The year 1816 was significant in that a series of New York decisions helped crystalize the
rule against the defaulting service contract employee. A per curiam
decision of the New York court" allowed recovery on a note given by
the employer in settlement of the employee's partially performed services, but hastened to point out that the contract being entire, in the
absence of the note there would have been no recovery. Spencer's
M'Millian decision was cited as authority for the court's obiter dictum.
Justice Spencer then denied recovery for part performance of a contract involving the clearing and fencing of land ;45 and later in the same
year Justice Van Nees used Spencer's two earlier decisions as his reason for refusing recovery to a seaman who had refused to help unload
certain cargo at its place of destination.46
Several decisions were handed down at the appellate level in New
York during the 1820's, 47 two by Justice Savage.48 Savage, using the
M Millan case as authority, clearly brought out the unbending severity
of the forfeiture rule in 1827, when he refused any relief to an employee who had completed ten and one half months' employment out of
a twelve month contract. In Savage's second decision, the employer
had ordered his employee to water cattle on Sunday, which the employee refused to do. The employer swore at him, and as a result the
employee quit the employment. Recovery was again denied; but the case
is of interest in that as obiter dicta Savage, while pointing out that it
was unnecessary for the decision, nevertheless questioned whether or
42

12 Tohns. 165 (N.Y. 1815).

43 2 B. & P. (N.R.) 61 ; 127 Eng. Rep. 533 (1805).

Seller agreed to deliver 100
bags of hops at a stated price by a certain time. Having delivered part of
hops, he commenced an action for the price thereof before the expiration of
the time for delivery of the balance. Held, the action could not be maintained as the contract was entire.
44 Thorpe v. White, 13 Johns. 53 (N.Y. 1816).
45 Jennings v. Camp, 13 Johns. 94 (N.Y. 1816). "It seems to be that the mere
statement of the case shows the illegality and injustice of the claim."

(Justice Spencer). Note that this is not a term employment contract.

46 Webb v. Duckingfield, 13 Johns. 390 (N.Y. 1816). The contract in this case
47

4

also contained a forfeiture clause.

Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1812) (Emphasis primarily on the issue of

divisibility); Lantry v. Parks, 8 Cowen 63 (1827); Marsh v. Rulesson, 1
Wend. 514 (N.Y. 1828).
sLantry v. Parks, supra note 47; Marsh v. Rulesson, supra note 47.
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not the employer would have been justified in turning away the employee without compensation if he had refused to obey his commands.
Savage felt that the employer would be so justified. This is the first
employment case in the United States to indicate a refusal of any recovery for part performance to the employee dischargedfor cause. It
should be noted that prior to Savage's expression in the Marsh case,
the few decisions in the United States involving employee's discharge
for cause had allowed recovery for the value of the part performance
in excess of damages resulting from the breach. These cases, however,
all originated in the South and arose from an entirely different employer-employee relationship. 49 The few English decisions prior to
1827 involving employees discharged for cause had refused any recovery.50
The early nineteenth century also saw decisions in Louisiana, Alabama and Massachusetts. The decisions in all three states denied recovery to the defaulting employee. The Louisiana decision, in 1819,51
involved the manager of a newspaper who terminated his work when
the owner published an article advocating monarchical power. The
court held that the manager possessed the right to refuse to print the
article, but could not publish it and then resign his employment. Although not emphasized by the court, the employment contract provided
that the manager's compensation would be an equal division of the
newspaper's profits. A distinction has at times been drawn when payment for the employee's services is to be computed based upon the employee's efforts for the entire employment term. The same distinction
has been suggested when payment for services is to be in land or chattels rather than money.52 In the Alabama decision, the court realized
that the rigid approach to the problem demanded a forfeiture of the
contract performance, but felt that this was justified when the deficiency was comparatively small "in order to preserve the inviolability
49 Grafton v. Collins, 3 Mart. (N.S.) 156 (La. 1824); McClure v. Pyatt, 4

McCord 26 (S.C. 1826); Byrd v. Boyd, 4 McCord 246 (S.C. 1827); Eaken v.
Harrison, 4 McCord 249 (S.C. 1827). Note that the employee in each of the

above cases was a plantation overseer. (A detailed discussion of the partial

performance interest of the employee discharged for cause is beyond the

scope of the present article, but is of sufficient importance to deserve special

consideration).
60 Robinson v. Hindman, 3 Esp. 235. 170 Eng. Rep. 599 (1800) ; Spain v. Arnot,
2 Stark 256, 171 Eng. Rep. 638 (1817) ; Brown v. Croft, 172 Eng. Rep. 1127 n.
(1828).
5' Mortmain v. Lafaux, 6 Mart. 654 (La. 1819); Wright v. Turner, 1 Stewart 29

(Ala. 1827); Shaw v. Wallace, 2 Stew. &P. 193 (Ala. 1832).

ON CONTRAcTs §1477, pp. 4129-30: "There are several situations
in which it seems desirable to retain the stricter view, for instance, where by
the terms of the contract the employee's right to compensation upon completion is not absolute but dependent upon the achievement of a specified result or
upon the success of the particular enterprise or that a promise of a bonus at
the end of a definite period. Another situation is where the return promised
is not for money but for land or chattels."

525 WILLISTON

1954]

INTEREST OF DEFAULTING EMPLOYEE

of contracts, and because of the impossibility of limiting innovations
53
upon them."
The six New York decisions between 1815 and 1828 set the pattern
of many judicial decisions to follow; however, it was the Massachusetts
54
decision, Stark v. Parker,
written by Justice Lincoln in 1824, that
first adequately analyzed the issues involved. Plaintiff's counsel foresaw the reasoning that would have to be specifically evaluated and induced the Massachusetts Supreme Court to come to task with the problems involved in the defaulting employee cases. Plaintiff's arguments
are basically those adopted ten years later by the New Hampshire court
in the famous case of Britton v. Turner.55 It was suggested that the
part performance interest of the defaulting employee included both a
damage element and an enrichment factor. The remedy proposed by
plaintiff was a return of the enrichment resulting from part performance over and above damages suffered by default. This is the remedy
adopted by Britton v. Turner. Although the laborer expected to perform, it was argued, such performance was not a condition precedent to
receiving payment for the partial performance over damages. 56 The
court however clung to condition precedent. It was also suggested that
plaintiff would not generally be disposed to breach his contract because
he would still be subject to payment of compensatory damages, while
the opposite view gave the employer the opportunity to subtly force the
employee to leave near the end of his performance, thus forfeiting all
benefit conferred. 57 This was also rejected with the suggestion that "to
say that this is not sufficient protection... is to require no less than the
law should presume what can never legally be established." It is submitted, however, that plaintiff was not proposing evidentiary proof
changes in order to protect the employee against the forfeiture rule, but
a modification of the forfeiture rule so that these difficult problems of
proof of pressure would not have to be encountered. Finally, the apparent discrepancy between default decisions involving sale of goods
and service-employment contracts was pointed out to the Court, but this
problem the Court passed by without comment and instead lashed out
with the comment that "nothing can be more unreasonable than that a
man who deliberately and wantonly violates an agreement should be
permitted to seek in a court of justice an indemnity from the consequences of his voluntary act. . ." (emphasis added). The question
might be raised as to whether subjugation to compensatory damages for
53 Shaw v. Wallace, supra note 51.
54 2 Pick. 267 (Mass. 1824).

6 N.H. 481 (1834).
55
56

Harnett & Thornton, The Insurance Condition Subsequent; A Needle In A
Semantic Haystack, 17 FoRD. L. REv.220, 231 (1948) ; Corbin, Conditions In
the Law of Contracts,28 YALE L. J.739, 749, note 23 (1919).
57
Restitution for Benefit Conferred by a Party in Default Under a Contract,
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (f) 1942, p. 35.
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contract breach is permitting an indemnity from the consequences of
the act. The arguments that prevailed in Britton v. Turner led Justice
Lincoln to comment that such relief would be a "monstrous absurdity."" Thus within the short period of nine years the rule denying any
established in
relief to the partially performing employee became well
59
the two key states of New York and Massachusetts.
V.

THE BRITTON V. TURNER DECISION

In 1834, Justice Parker of the New Hampshire Supreme Court
handed down the now famous decision that has aroused such controversy. Arriving only nineteen years after the first American appellate
case on the issue, reasoned in detail, and fortified by the strong judicial
reluctance. of many courts toward creating unnecessary forfeiture, the
decision seemed to have strong possibilities of influencing decisions in
the many states that had not yet come to grips at the appellate level
with the problem.
Parker recognized and sought to rectify the divergence within decisions involving breach in different types of employment contracts.
There seemed to be no justifiable reason for permitting the defaulting
seller of goods to recover for his part performance and denying equal
relief to the service contract employee.6 0 The longer the employee
served, the more inequitable the forfeiture rule became at the time of
breach. Woodward, writing in the early twentieth century, thought that
a "wilful" defaulter should not be permitted to point out such inequity.
When the employee's hands were soiled by wilful wrongdoing, he was
alleged to be hardly in a position seriously to complain of the inequity. 61
"Wilfulness" to Woodward thereby became the justification for recognition of an acknowledged inequitable rule.
Woodward placed his distinction on the basis of the "wilfulness" of
the default. The term "wilful" is both illusive and variable depending
upon the fact situation involved. It is a term rarely used when relief is
allowed to the defaulter; while, in contrast, almost invariably the
court's inclusion of the term within its decision forecasts a denial of
58 Supra note 54. "It will not admit of the monstrous absurdity that a man

may voluntarily and without cause violate his agreement and make the very
breach of that agreement the foundation of an action which he could not
maintain under it."
58 Phelps v. Sheldon, 13 Pick. 50 (Mass. 1832) reaffirming the Massachusetts
view (Stark v. Parker) but only as obiter dicta-(the defaulter having received full compensation for his part performance prior to default).
60
Supra note 55, pp. 489-90; Supra note 57, p. 36.
62 "Clearly, the wilful contract breaker is not to be given the right to recover,
merely because a denial of such right may cause him greater loss if he performs part of his engagement than if he disregards it from the beginning, or
because such denial may result in a greater enrichment of the defendant in
case of abandonment after part performance than in case of complete performance of the engagement." WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CoNraAcr
§168, p. 272 (1913).

1954]

INTEREST OF DEFAULTING EMPLOYEE

recovery to the defaulting employee. Such use of the term indicates to
Corbin "a childlike faith in the existence of a plain and obvious line
between the good and the bad, between unfortunate virtue and unforgiveable sin." 62 The Restatement of Contracts also suggests the use of
the term "wilful" as the test of recovery. The suggestion is that a
distinction be drawn between knowingly and wilfully done acts. It is
not wilful "if it is the result of mere negligence, or error of judgment,
or mistake of fact or law, or is due to hardship, insolvency, or cir-cumstances that tend appreciably towards moral justification. '6 3 Terms
such as hardship and error of judgment are almost as illusive as the
terms they attempt to define, and few courts have accepted the dividing line between wilful and non-wilful breach as being established by
"moral justification" for the breach. The extreme cases on either side
give little trouble. As usual, it is the fact situations that shade towards
the center that need more positive judicial assistance for evaluation of
the rights of the contracting parties.
The alleged injustice caused by enrichment in excess of damages
resulting from the majority rule and the difference in judicial attitude
towards the defaulting employee as compared with the defaulting
vendee are both also justified by Woodward when the employee's
breach is "wilful".6 4
Justice Parker justified his decision in Britton v. Turner as the basis
of "general community understanding" and the theory of implied acceptance. The first of these has found little acceptance in the United
States in employment breach cases. There was no general usage in the
community calling for the employer to pay his defaulting employee for
the period of performed Work. Implied acceptance was based upon
Parker's suggestion that the employer "in truth stipulates to receive it
(labor) from day to day as it is performed... and the party must have
understood when he made the contract that there was to be such acceptance." The fact that intangible service is incapable of return made
no difference "for it has still been received by his assent." This reasoning may also be doubted, for the nineteenth century employer never
subjectively thought in terms of day to day acceptance of part performance, and certainly not when the benefit was intangible. Indebitatus
assumpsit necessitates the finding of an implied promise to pay, and this
underlies justice Parker's theory of implied acceptance. It is implied
by the Court for judicial reasons, and not by the employer on the basis
of contractual consent. It may, however, be argued that the acceptance
625 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1123, pp.
63
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACrS §357 (1)

545-6 (1951).

; Comment on sub. 1, paragraph (e), p. 626.
64 "As to this argument it need only to be said that the analogy relied upon by
the court [Britton v. Turner] fails utterly, in that none of the cases of
building and sales contracts cited in the opinion appears to be a case of
wilful breach. And the distinction while very frequently overlooked is a vital
one." Supra note 61, p. 273, §170.
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indicates a satisfaction of a desired want and thereby falls under the
broader definition of the term "benefit" creating a quasi-contractual
obligation for unjust enrichment. Professor Patterson feels that this is
apparently the assumption used in allowing recovery to the defaulting
6 5
seller of goods under section 44 of the Uniform Sales Act.

VI.

THE INFLUENCE OF BRITTON v. TURNER IN BREACH OF
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT DECISIONS

At the time that Britton v. Turner was handed down in 1834, only
'New York and Massachusetts had established a clear pattern of cases
refusing all relief to the employee terminating his employment without
"'justifiable" cause. In most jurisdictions, the matter was still to be
presented to the courts for initial consideration. How much influence
did the Britton case have upon these decisions? Consideration must
first be given to its influence during the first twenty-five years after
1834. In this period before 1860 it has been suggested that the decision
had considerable effect and that recovery was allowed to the defaulting
employee in a number of jurisdictions. Only the term service employment contract (the type of fact situation involved in the Britton v.
Turner decision) is presently under consideration. A study of these
cases reveals that the influence of Britton v. Turner may have been
overrated. The following cases granted relief to the defaulter during
this period, and many of them referred to the Britton decision. Included
within this category are cases from Vermont, in which the default was
in defective work rather than abandonment after part performance, 6 a
New Hampshire ruling in which the damages from the breach equaled
the value of services performed, 67 from Louisiana, where the employer
rather than the employed school teacher may have actually been the
breaching party,6 8 an Iowa decision similar to the earlier Vermont case in
that breach after part performance was not involved, 9 and two Indiana
decisions that were actually only obiter dicta approval by the court of
the Britton v. Turner decision.7 0 It was actually not until 1859, twenty
five years after Britton v. Turner, that the first case closely resembling
the facts of the Britton case applied the same remedy for a defaulting
employee and used similar reasoning in so doing. 71
See Acts, Recommendation and Study Relating to Recovery for Benefits Conferred by Party in Default Under Contract, Law Revision Commission of
New York (1942), at p. 35, for Professor Patterson's expression of this
same view.
66 Dyer v. Jones, 8 Vt. 205 (1836).
67 Elliott v. Health, 14 N.H. 131 (1843).
6
sLefrancois v. Charbonnet, "5Rob. 185 (La. 1843). "The defendant's failure
to pay her either quarterly or by the year released her from the contract."
There was also an indication that employer breached contract by demanding
that she teach additional children not required by her contract.
69 Davis v. Fish, 1 G. Green 466 (Iowa 1848).
70 Epperly v. Bailey, 3 Ind. 73 (1851); Ricks v. Yates, 5 Ind. 115 (1854).
71 Pixler v. Nichols, 8 Iowa 106 (1859).
65
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During this same quarter century, in addition to decisions in New
York and Massachusetts, redress was denied to the defaulting service
contract employee in eleven jurisdictions, including four decisions in
Alabama, three in Vermont and two each in Massachusetts, Illinois and
Missouri.7 2 It is clear, therefore, that the great majority of decisions
during this period did not accept the proposed remedy of Britton v.
Turner. It was adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court in 1859,73 and
again nineteen years later in Kansas- Parsons, in writing his text on
contracts, expressed the view that the law on contract breach cases was
changing; and Justice Vallentine, in allowing recovery to a defaulting
service contract employee, failed to consider Parson's footnote in which
he commented, "We are not aware that there are any cases upon contracts for service fully sustaining the proposition in the text except the
celebrated one of Britton v. Turner... The courts of other states have
thus far shown little disposition to adopt the views of that learned
judge.1 74 Parsons failed to include the Iowa decision of Pixler v.
Nichols, but this would not justify the Kansas view that "many cases"
had changed the law of contract default "in all of its various aspects".
Four earlier Iowa decisions are also cited, but none of them involve
service employment contracts.75
Two Nebraska decisions in 1880 and 190276 under the misapprePettigrew v. Bishop, 3 Ala. 441 (1842) (overseer case), relies on
Cutler v. Powell as authority; Norris v. Moore, 3 Ala. 676 (1842); Givan v.
Dailey's Admr., Ala. 1842; (condition precedent); Nesbitt v. Drew, 17 Ala.

72 ALABAMA:

379 (1850) (slaves, entire contract, condition precedent).
CALIFORNIA: Hutchinson v. Wetmore, 2 Cal. 310 (1852) (entire contract,
relies on M'Millian v. Vanderlip from N.Y., mpra note 42).
GEORGIA: Henderson v. Stiles, 14 Ga. 135 (1853), seems to make no distinction between abandonment and discharge for cause.
ILLINOIS:

Eldridge v. Rowe, 2 Gilm. 91, 7 III. 91 (1845) (Similar to Britton
Badgely v. Heald, 4 Gilm. 64 (Ill. 1847).

v. Turner-recovery here denied);

LouISIANA: Hays v. Marsh, 11 La. 369 (1837)
MAssAcHusErs: Brown v. Vinal, 3 Metc. 533

(plantation overseer).
(Mass. 1842) (obiter dicta);

Davis v. Maxwell, 12 Metc. 286 (Mass. 1847).
MAINE: Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. 102 (1852).
Missouwi: Caldwell v. Dickson, 17 Mo. 575 (1853) ; Schneer v. Lemp, 19 Mo.
40 (1853) (based upon Posey v. Garth, 7 Mo. 96, which was not abandonment but discharge for cause, and cf. Halpin Mfg. Co. v. School Dist., 54 Mo.
App. 371 (1893).
NEw. JERSEY: Erwin v. Ingram, 4 Zab. 520 (N.J. 1854).
NEw YoRK: Monell v. Burns, 4 Denio 121 (N.Y. 1847).
OHIO: Larkin v. Buck, 11 Ohio St. 561 (1860).
TENN .SSEE: Hughes v. Cannon, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 622 (1854)

Ripley v. Chipman, 13 Vt. 268 (1841) ; In Winn v. Southgate, 17
355 (1845), abandonment resulted from employee's mistake; Mullen v.

VERMONT:

Vt.

Gilkinson. 19 Vt. 503 (1847).

73 See note 71, supra.

523, 524, 526 (6th ed.).
5McClay v. Hedge, 18 Iowa 66 (construction contract to build barn, shed and
corncrib); McAffery v. Hale, 24 Iowa 536 (delivery of hogs); Byerlee v.

742 PARSONS ON CONTRAcTs

7

76

Mendel, 39 Iowa 382 (term contract, but defaulting employee was a minor);
Wolf v. Gerk, 43 Iowa 339 (construction contract).
Parcell v. McComber, 11 Neb. 209 (1880) ; Murphy v. Sampson, 2 Neb. 297,
96 N.W. 494 (1902). The latter case compounded the mistake of the earlier
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hension that Britton v. Turner was "quite generally, through not
uniformly followed" and that the law (following Britton v. Turner)
"may be considered to be pretty generally settled throughout the western
states," also allowed the defaulting employee the value of his part performance in excess of the damages caused by his breach after part performance. Sedgwick, writing in 1896, also expressed the view that that
law had changed in most jurisdictions, but for the employment service
contract cites only the Britton v. Turner decision as authority for his
statement.77 A North Dakota decision also granted recovery to the employee with the expression that "less injustice was liable to be done
under [the Britton v. Turner] doctrine than under the more strict and
rigid rules formerly prevailing" (emphasis added). '
The latter part of the nineteenth c~ntury thus produced only a few
service employment decisions that followed Britton v. Turner, some of
these on the erroneous belief that they were following what had become
a majority rule within the United States. During this same period there
were over a dozen decisions denying any relief in similar fact situations,7 and it was clear that most jurisdictions felt that the intentionally defaulting employee should not receive any of the value of his part
performance. The divergence between decisions involving default by
the vendee of goods and the employee was rarely recognized, and only a
few courts tried to reconcile their decisions.6 0
by the expression, "Nearly all of the older cases [refused recovery], but we
think a "majority of the later cases sustain the doctrine [of Britton v. Turner]." (Emphasis added.)
77 SEGWICK, ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES 215 (1896).
78
Bedlow v. Tompkin, 5 S.D. 432, 59 N.W. 222 (1894). Relief to the defaulting
employee was also granted during this period in McMillan v. Malloy, 10 Neb.
228, 4 N.W. 1004 (1880), but this case involved a contract to thresh a crop of
wheat and oats and not a general employment contract for a stated term;
and in Halpin Mfg. Co. v. School Dist, 54 Mo. App. 311, there is obiter
dicta as to the employee's right of recovery, although the case actually involves a vendee's default in the sale of a furnace. In Riggs v. Horde, 25 Tex.
Supp. 456 (1860), a school teacher quit her employment, but court found
"her attendance on her sick mother rendered her absence necessary."
1.9FEDEAL: Mallory v. Mackaye, 92 Fed. 749 (2d Cir. 1899).
ILLINOIS: Hansell v. Erickson, 28 Ill. 257 (1862).
LOuISIANA: Callahan v. Stafford, 18 La. App. 556 (1866).
MARYLAND: Dougherty Co. v. Gring, 89 Md. 535, 43 A. 912 (1899).
MINNESOTA: Nelicha v. Esterly, 29 Minn. 146 (1882); Peterson v. Mayer, 46
Minn. 468, 49 N.W. 245 (1891).
NEw JERSEY: Mather v. Brokaw, 43 N.J.L. 587 (1881).
MissouRi: Hensen v. Hampton, 32 Mo. 408 (1862); Earp v. Tyler, 73 Mo.
617 (1881) ; Banse v. Tate, 62 Mo. App. 150 (1895).
OREGON: Steeples v. Newton, 7 Ore. 110 (1879).
WISCONSIN: Diefenback v. Stark, 56 Wis. 462, 14 N.W. 621 (1883) (discussion
of contract divisibility); Walsh v. Esher, 102 Wis. 172, 78 N.W. 437 (1889)
(Dockworker quit employment because of threat of physical injury by other
striking workers-fifteen day wage liquidated damage clause held to equal
value of benefit conferred).
80 The distinction was recognized by the Kansas and Missouri courts: see Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99 (1878) : "It will perhaps be admitted that the doctrine preventing recovery for partial performance has been overruled with
respect to all contracts except those for personal services; and if so, then
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The twentieth century has produced little appellate litigation involving default in farm service contracts, and recovery for excess part
performance interest has usually been denied.8 1 There has been a shift
in the type of contract litigation involving the part performance interest
of the defaulter. The issue has become one of periodic bonus, sales
commission or division of business profit. These and the contract for
care and support of the aged property owner have supplanted the typical nineteenth century farm employment contract for a season or year.
Williston suggests that the strict view of the nineteenth century should
be applied in both situations ;82 and the courts have consistently followed this view when the default involves a periodic bonus, 3 sales commission," profit sharing plan,85 or vacation compensation.8 8
Most "family support cases", many of which were adjudicated in
the early twentieth century, denied any relief to the relative who partly
performed his support contract8 7 Several Kansas cases during this
there is not much of the doctrine left. But, if the doctrine is to be abandoned
with reference to all contracts except those for personal services, then why
not abandon the doctrine altogether?" The Missouri court in 1893 came to
the erroneous conclusion that "There is no longer any distinction as to the
application of this doctrine to any of these cases [sales, work and labor or
employment]. It is equally applicable to all alike."
81Porter v. Whitlock, 142 Iowa 66, 120 N.W. 649 (1909); Stolle v. Stuart, 21
S.D. 643, 114 N.W. 1007 (1908) ; Lynn v. Seby, 29 N.D. 420, 151 N.W. 31
(1915): "Either rule must under certain circumstances work injustices.
Otherwise there would be no division of authority. We elect to follow that
which we believe to be the trend of authority." (Emphasis added).
82 "There are several situations in which it seems desirable to retain the stricter
view, for instance, where by the terms of the contract the employee's right
to compensation upon completion is not absolute but dependent unon the
achievement of a specific result or upon the success of the particular enterprise, or that of a promise of a bonus at the end of a definite period....
Another situation might possibly be mentioned in this connection. Where the
agreement is one of care and support, the need for the services promised is
likely to increase with the passage of years, and the defaulting plaintiff's
breach is not readily compensable in damages." 5 Wn.usToN oN CoxTRAcrs
8 3 §1477, pp. 4129, 4130.
Meredith v. Youngstrom Co., 205 N.W. 749 (Iowa 1925) ; Health v. Chas. L.
84 Huisking & Co., 72 N.Y.S. 2d 14 (1948).
Kless v. Bick & Kuhl Co., 205 Ill. App. 167 (1917).
85
Friedle v. First Nat. Bank, 129 Misc. 309, 221 N.Y.S. 292 (1927).
86
Pellett v. Ton Tex Corp., 77 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1948). Recovery has also been
denied on the basis of condition precedent when the employment contract
called for a deduction from wages during the winter to be repaid during the
following summer. The employee defaulted before summer. This type of
case can be distinguished from the typical bonus case in that the forfeited
wages had already been earned.
87 Ptacek v. Pisa, 231 Il. 522, 83 N.E. 221 (1907).
Care for step-father and
mother in their home. "The fact that they found it more difficult to care
for him than they anticipated did not justify appellants in violating their
contract." (They had sent the step-father to the poor house and brought suit
for quantum meruit). "The courts cannot make such contracts for them."
See also Thurston v. Nutter, 125 Me. 411, 134 Atl. 506 (1926). Care for
non-relative in exchange for conveyance of her property upon death. The
court said "there would be an increasing tendency to break existing contracts"; Tussey v. Owen, 139 N.C. 461, 52 S.E. 128 (1905). Care of father
by daughter in exchange for promise to will one fourth of his property. The
daughter married and left. In Sildden v. Meyer, 110 Wis. 1 (1910), the
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period allowed recovery to the defaulter," but the most striking case is
the Indiana decision of Humphrey v. Johnson.8 9 The court felt that the
plaintiff, a distant relative, should be allowed to resign his care and support of the aged defendant at any time "and for any reason satisfactory
to himself" (emphasis added). A relation of trust and confidence must
be established; and should aversion, hatred, distrust and discontent
arise, then the Court visualized a situation that would become intolerable for the aged defendant. Under such undesirable circumstances to
cause plaintiff's compensation to depend upon continued performance
of the support contract would involve both impropriety and danger.
Either party should be allowed at any time arbitarily to abandon performance and adjust their rights on the basis of quantum meruit. The
aged person, however, becomes more, dependent upon complete fulfilment of the contract proportionately with the degree of performance.
In addition, the damages resulting from plaintiff's breach are not
readily compensable in money damages.9 0 To allow the other party to
quit at will converts a definite term contract into an indefinite one,
flexible but unsuited to the needs of the aged defendant.
An early Ohio decision refused relief to the defaulter because "so
radical a change in the legal effect of entire contracts, and the breach
of them should originate with the legislature and not with the judiciary." 9' 1 The legislature of Arkansas, in 1883, expressed the same view
as the majority of the courts; and, based upon this statute, the Arkansas
9 2
Supreme Court denied recovery to a defaulting farm hand.
During the second half of the nineteenth century the majority of
American decisions rejected the remedy proposed by Britton v. Turner,
and the twentieth century opinions reaffirm this attitude.9 3 Only a few
plaintiff was housekeeper for defendant's decedent, the agreement being that
a certain amount was to be paid monthly and an additional amount on death.
She left before promisor's death. Schultz v. Andrus, 178 Wis. 358, 190 N W.
83 (1922): Sister-in-law kept house for deceased for five years and then
married and left. "Where a valid express contract is proven no recovery
can be had on an implied contract." See also Roszina v. Nemeth, 251 Wis.
62 (1946).
88 Holland v. Holland, 97 Kan. 169, 155 Pac. 5 (1916) ; In Masterson v. Masterson, 100 Kan. 108, 163 Pac. 617 (1917) the contract was abandoned for reasons
not "chargeable to one party more than to the other."
8973 Ind. App. 551, 127 N.E. 819 (1920): "The common law doctrine . . . has
fallen into disfavor and does not prevail. In our country it has been supplanted by the more humane rule laid down in Britton v. Turner." The
support contract cases do not bear out the statement. See comment on case
in 69 U. oF PA. L. Rzv. 187 (1921) and Note, 47 A.L.R. 1164, discussing the
case.
90 5 WILUSTON ON CONTRACTs §1477, pp. 4129-30.
91 Larkin v. Buck, 11 Ohio St. 561 (1860).
92
Lanthan v. Varwick, 87 Ark. 328, 113 S.W. 646 (1908).
93
ALABAMA: Varner v. Hardy, 209 Ala. 575, 96 So. 860 (1923).
DIsTucr OF COLUmBIA: Cole v. DeBobula. 39 F.2d 630 (D.C. 1944) (no
benefit actually conferred).
IowA: Barnes v. Bradford, 165 N.W. 306 (Iowa 1917) (Contract to level
dirt along drainage ditch).
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cases have recently allowed the recovery of excess benefit over damages. The difficulty of proving the extent of damages may have in94
directly influenced some of these decisions.

VIl. REASONS OPPOSING ADOPTION OF THE BRITTON v. TURNER RULE
1) Relief Would EncourageBad Faith: Some courts have asserted
that if relief were to be granted to the defaulting employee bad faith
breach of contract in future situations would be encouraged.9 This is a
judicial method of preventative law with the assumption that future
legal transactions are based upon prior judicial opinions. Within commercial fields of our legal system, this attitude may find sufficient vindication. Business transactions are frequently considered in advance, and
the existing legal status of the contracting parties affects the nature of
their future relationship. However, it is unrealistic to assume that the

service contract employee, who may be induced by one of many reasons
to terminate his contract, will be either greatly encouraged to violate his
contract because of existing judicial decisions within his state, or disMIssouRI: Walden v. American Bankers Assur. Co., 183 Mo. App. 376, 166
S.W. 1111 (1914).
NEw JERSEY: Natalizzio v. Valentino, 71 N.J.L. 500, 59 At. 8 (1904) (Employed as baker).

NEW YORK: Johnson Bros. v. American Union Line, 185 N.Y.S. 930 (App.
Div. 1920). (Contract to remove water from hold of defendant's ship. Case
could probably have also been decided on fact that benefit was less than
resulting damages); Fokine v. Shubert, 210 App. Div. 468. 206 N.Y.S. 311
(1924) (Service in production of operetta ballet) ; Stevens v. Elizabeth Arden,
253 App. Div. 358, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 187 (1938) ; DeLong v. Elizabeth Arden Inc.,
16 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1939) (Royalties for cosmetics).
NORTH CAROLINA: Goldston Bros., Inc. v. Newkirk, 233 N.C. 428, 64 S.E.2d
424 (1951) (Broker's services; no benefit conferred).
SOUTH CAROLINA: Hardwick v. Page, 124 S.C. 111, 117 S.E. 204 (1922)
(Sharecropper).
CONTRA:

Buckwalter v. Bradley,
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 122 Ky. 707, 92 S.W. 966 (1906) ;"
31 Ky. 1177, 104 S.W. 970 (1907) (Plaintiff cut trees on defendant's land).
Davidson v. Gaskill, 32 Okla. 40, 121 Pac. 649 (1912) (By obiter dicta the
court said that the plaintiff had a right to recover in quantum meruit but
had already received more than this amount); San Augustine Independent
School Dist. v. Freelove, 195 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1946): "Texas is one of the
states that have adopted the doctrine of Britton v. Turner."
94Asher v. Tomlinson, 22 Ky. 1494, 60 S.W. 714 (1901). Riech v. Bolch, 68
Iowa 526, 27 N.W. 507 (1886) (Plaintiff quit with large quantity of uncut
hay still in field, employer could not get other help. Court held that "the
damages sustained by defendant in the loss of the hay are too remote to be
recovered in an action for a violation of the contract!' See also Lynn v.
Seby, 29 N.D. 420, 151 N.W. 31 (1915) (Fluctuation in price of wheat between time of promised performance and completion of work by third party
after plaintiff's breach. Held, damages too indefinite).
95 See Hughes v. Cannon, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 622 (1854). "It would certainly
operate most unjustly to so extend the relaxation of the common law rule
requiring the plaintiff to show the performance of the contract on his part
as a condition to recovery as to embrace a case like the present. It would
encourage bad faith. . .'. (Emphasis added). Hutchinson v. Wetmore, 2 Cal.
310 (1852): ". . . to sustain an action. as it now stands would be a violation
of law, and serve to 'encourage an infraction of contracts for frivolous
causes, or without any reason whatever."
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couraged to the extent that this will cause him to perform the balance
of the agreement. It would be necessary that the employee have knowledge of the existing law on the issue, and then evaluate his legal position when he considers abandoning performance. It is doubted that the
employee who leaves his employment evaluates the advantages of paying only provable damages resulting from the breach as opposed to losing all of the value of his partly performed contract. Both knowledge of
law and deliberate evaluation of consequences would be required. The
minority of states that adopt the relief .of Britton v. Turner bear this
out, in that there has been no marked tendency towards employment
contract breach within these jurisdictions.
2) Relief Would Destroy the Sanctity of Contract Promises: This,
as well as the above reason, is not a judicial attempt to justify the total
forfeiture rule by proof of its merit, but an attack upon the proposed
alternative of Britton v. Turner. It is generally coupled with the affirmative view that the courts should discourage contract breach. The
issue is not whether the legal system should encourage performance of
the legal promise, a matter generally conceded, but whether the generally adopted "forfeiture rule" encourages performance more than the
"breach damages" rule of Britton v. Turner. If this be decided in the
affirmative, there is still the second question whether the degree of encouraged performance gained outweighs the loss when the employer retains more performance benefit than the damages he suffers.
Judicial decisions often state that if the defaulting employee receives recognition for the value of any of his part performance the
sanctity of his contract promise will be violated.06 What creates the
sanctity of this promise? It is not the fact per se that a promise has
been given, for not all promises exchanged between men have ever
been enforceable by society. It would neither be desirable nor practicably feasible to give judicial recognition to all promises that are made
daily.9 7 This was true at the times of Plato 8 and Cicero,99 and even in
-Canon law. 00 The views of Kantians like Reinack that all covenants
create a duty without which rational society would be impossible are refuted by actual day to day experience in which many promises go unenforced. Pound expressed the view that all business promises should
0
9

See supra note 95. "It would encourage bad faith and destroy the sanctity
of contracts."
"The principle that promise or consent creates obligations is foreign to the
idea of justice.... It is plain that if anyone promises a friend to give him
something and does not do it, he does not commit an injustice-at least,
understood, if he does not wrong this friend indirectly." TouRTouLoN, PHILOSOPHY IN

THE DEVELOPMENT

OF LAW

499-500 (Read's translation, 1922);
YALE L. J. 52,

Fuller and Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46

56 n. (1936).

981 PLATO, REPUBLIc 311.
99
1 CicRO, DE OFFICnS, C.
0

10; III, cc. 24-25.
' ODecretales of Gregory IX. Lib. II, tit. 24, cc. 1, 2, 3, 15, 23, 27, 33; Sexti
Decretalium, Lib. V, reg. 58.

1954]

INTEREST OF DEFAULTING EMPLOYEE

be enforced since such promises create wealth, and their enforcement is
necessary in order to maintain wealth as a basis of our civilization.
With even this limitation placed on the legal enforcement of promises,
Cohen still disagrees with Pound's view.' 0 ' To Bentham the origin of
obligations is based upon the reason of "utility"; and to place the foundation upon natural rights, Divine law, so social or quasi contract "is an
oblique and roundabout process involving uncertainty and embarrassment and leading to interminable disputes.'

02

Page01 rebelled at

granting legal enforcement to "pure" moral obligations which he felt
called for
"replacemeit of our law of consideration with the ethical principle that an honest man keeps his promise although to his own
hurt, and with the constitutional principle that it is the primary
duty of our courts to make people be honest, or at least, to act as
though they were honest ;103 and as the result, to take the position
that all promises must be enforced without regard to the presence or absence of valuable consideration.104
To both Cook and Page, certain agreements between men are not
legally enforceable because the duty is not one that should properly be
placed upon our judicial system. Cicero and Kent both expressed the
view that the reason certain promises of men were not given legal
sanction was because certain principles of higher ethics are "too austere
in their nature, and too sublime in speculation for actual use amidst
human laws."'10 5 Just as Chancellor Kent agreed with Cicero, so Dean
101 COHEN, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER 90 (1933).
202 "Consult those masters of the science, Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaque, Vatel,

Montesquieu, Locke, Rousseau and the crown of commentators. When they
wish to lay open the origin of obligations they tell you of a natural right, of a
law anterior to man, of the Divine law, of conscience, of a social contract,
of a tacit contract, of a quasi contract etc. I know that these terms are not
incompatible with the true principle, because all of them by explanations more
or less forced may be made to signify good and evil. But this oblique and
roundabout process involves uncertainty and embarrassment, and leads to
interminable disputes.... It is the reason of utility which gives the contract
all its force; thereby it is that the cases are distinguished in which a contract ought to be corfirmed, as well as those in which it ought to be
annulled." BENTHAM, HISTORY OF LEcISLATION, (2nd ed.), Principles of the
Civil Code, Part Second, Chapter V, p. 193.
103 "Itseems therefore to be expected about one whose thinking took shape under
such a 'climate of opinion' would adopt as one of his fundamental premises
the notion that the purpose of the law of contracts is to put pressure on
people to do what they have promised to do; simply that and nothing more.
That the adoption of this particular premise was tacitly made and without
discussion of its validity was perhaps also to be expected." (Cook commenting on Williston's attitude as to the purpose of the law of contracts). See
Cook. Williston on Contracts, 33 ILL. L. REv. 497. 503.
104 "Let us keep what we have won in the form of common law consideration and
let us be thankful for it: unless indeed we are willing to go all out for
morality, following Mfansfield the less in his ethics, though not in his profanity; willing to throw overboard all ideas of realism and practical operation of our law...." P.age, Consideration:Genuine and Synthetic, 1947 Wis.
L. REv.483, 513.
205 2 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 490, 491 (4th ed. 1840).
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Pound agreed with Kent that "the sphere of morality is more enlarged
than the limits of civil jurisdiction." 10°8 Although there has been divergence of view as to the reason that all of man's promises are not
legally recognized, it is generally agreed that only a small proportion of
man's promises fall within the judicial sphere. It has been suggested
that a measurement of development- within the field of contract law is
the extent of legally enforceable promises.
During the nineteenth century emphasis was placed upon freedom
of the individual will with the accompanying attitude of caveat emptor.
The risk of performance was placed upon the individual. He was free
not to assume the task of performance necessitated by contract promise,
and therefore once having promised to undertake performance, he must
either completely perform the entire contract as promised or receive no
compensation for his labor. With such a judicial attitude of assumed
risk prevalent, the courts placed more importance on the intentional
breach than on the enrichment of the defendant. In this atmosphere it
was understandable to find judicial decisions creating forfeiture of the
employee's part performance on the grounds of "enforcing the sanctity
of contracts."
3) Relief Would Weaken the Right of Reliance: If it were permitted to the laborer to determine the contract at his pleasure, no well
founded reliance could be placed at any time upon its due observance.
Future calculations have to be built upon the support of others. Not
only does the contracting party rely upon the given promise to the extent of preparatory expenses, but he often forgoes the opportunity of
securing equivalent promises of performance from other sources.' 07
Pufendorf expressed the view that from breach of faith "are apt to
arise entirely just causes for quarrels and wars" ;108 and, regardless of
the amount of actual damage suffered because of the promisor's breach,
"it is a shame to be mocked because [you] believe the other to be a
prudent and honest man."110 9 Llewellyn writing at a more recent date expressed the same view as to the importance to the businessman of right
of reliance upon performance of the contract promise. "Business men
offer, together with the promising and as its consequence, a continuing
expectation and sense of security-an assurance in result as well as in
expression-which is immediate and continuing value in itself. This as106

Pound feels that moral man should keep all of his promises, but the fact that
legal systems only enforce those made for a consideration established his
belief that "the provinces of law and morality are not co-existensive." POUND,
LAW AND MORALS 37 (1926).

Miller v. Goddard, 34 Me. 102 (1852). See also 34 MARQ. L. REv. 218 (1951):
"When the seller commits himself, he wants assurance that the buyer will
perform, and to permit recovery of the part payment defeats the purpose of
the contract."
08
1 PUFENDORF, THE Two Booxs ON THE DuTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN AccoRDiNG
TO THE NATURAL LAW, (Moore Trans. 1927), First Book, Chapter LX, p. 48.
109 Ibid. p. 49.
107
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surance is offered to be relied on; and after the deal is 'on', is not to be
withdrawn ... ,,"1 This right of reliance, however, is of greater importance to the commercial contract than to the non-commercial one.
The industrial employer relies for production purposes on availability
of ready labor. The private employment contract for specific task often
does not necessitate the same degree of reliance on completed performance. The performance of the specific promised task is not integrated
into future transactions involving additional contractual relations.
The importance of the reliance factor should not be underestimated,
however; it must be evaluated with specific reference to the amount it is
affected by the .application of the conflicting rules as to the employee's
right to compensation for part performance. Unless the refusal of the
courts to require the non-defaulting employer to pay for enrichment
in excess of damages increases the probabilities of the employer in
future contracts being able to rely upon the employee's complete performance, then it should not be sufficient ground for forfeiting all of
the defaulting employee's completed performance. The stricter rule
must stimulate complete performance in order to increase the right of
employer's reliance. Since it has previously been suggested that the
employee's quitting his employment is infrequently related to the extent
of loss that such action will produce, the employer's reliance may in
turn be only slightly affected by the court's attitude towards the employee's partial performance interest.
4) The Condition Precedent: The terms "wilful' and "condition
precedent" are frequently found in judicial opinions denying any compensation to the employee who abandons his employment contract. Both
terms have been classified as merely labels indicating the attitude of the
court. Complete performance of the employment contract has been
stated as a condition precedent to the employee's right to enforce the
contract terms, and also stated as a condition to any recovery for partial
performance. As first stated, the defaulting employee merely loses his
right to enforce the contract; however, the latter statement also eliminates his right to quasi-ontract recovery based upon prevention of unjust enrichment of the employer. Condition precedent is used by the
court to deny relief only in those situations where there is also a finding
of "wilful" breach. The first definition is used when the breach is nonwilful. It is, therefore, the causation factor within the breach that
shapes the court's use of condition precedent in the employment default
cases. As Harnett and Thornton have pointed out, "The label 'precedent' and 'subsequent' is often attached after the court has decided
what the pleading burden shall be; and rather than serving as a guide
to the court's determination of the procedural question, the words
1

1OLlewellyn, Our Case Law of Contracts, 48

YALE

L. J. 779, 790 (1938).
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simply explain a result which the court has reached."''
The validity of
a conclusion cannot be determined by a rule of law if the rule is based
upon an erroneous presupposition. The quarrel cannot be with the application of the given rule, but with the use of the rule itself." 2 The
principle of condition precedent has had an artificial influence on the
breached employment contract, so that the use of this rule of contract
law has been used to defeat quasi-contract recovery.
5) Impossibility of Rejecting Benefit Conferred: Numerous decisions have denied relief to the defaulting employee because it was
deemed unjust to "force" the duty of payment upon the non-defaulting
employer, when the benefit received was an intangible service." 3 A,distinction on this ground is sometimes made between the service contract and the construction or sales contract in which the benefit conferred is tangible. The election to accept or return, however, often is not
available in these contracts. The power of rejection extended to the
owner of land who has received a partly completed building is of little
value to him. The manufacturer or processer of goods who must use
the goods in raw form as partially delivered has no option of return of
the delivered goods when the supplier defaults after partial performance of the contract. Section 44 of the Uniform Sales Act imposes
liability on the non-defaulting buyer of goods to the extent of their reasonable value, when he has disposed of them without knowledge of the
impending default of his seller. It has been suggested that the test
should be merely one of enrichment of the defendant, and that he
should compensate the employee for the benefit in excess of damages
4
regardless of whether he retains it from choice or from necessity."1
6) Inadequacy of the Remedy Proposed: The employer is primarily
interested in complete execution of the contract by the employee. When
the employee defaults, the most satisfactory remedy from the employer's viewpoint would usually be the equitable relief of specific performance of the agreement. It is the expectation interest of the employer
that needs protection; however, the difficulty of supervision necessary
"I1Harnett & Thornton, The Insurance Condition Subsequent; A Needle in a
Semantic Haystack, 17 FORD. L. REv. 220, 231 (1948).
Laube, The Defaulting Employee-Britton v. Turner Reviewed, 83 U. OF PA.
L. Rxv. 825, 827 (1935); LAUBE, CASES ON QUASI CONTRACT 196 (1952).
113 See Varner v. Hardy, 209 Ala. 575 (1923) ; Johnson v. Fehsefeldt, 106 Minn.
202, 118 N.W. 797 (1908): "The fact that the plaintiff had rendered services,
the value of which defendant retained, did not entitle plantiffs to recover on
quantum meruit because of the contract and the inability of defendants to
112

114

return the services."

Duncan v. Baker, 21 Kan. 99 (1878): "The reason usually given is that the
employer in contracts for personal services has no choice except to accept,

receive and retain the services already performed, while in other contracts he

may refuse to accept, or may return the proceeds of the partially performed
contract, if he choose. But this is not always, nor even generally true, with
respect to other contracts." (Suggests the examples where the miller purchases and processes wheat, or the owner of real estate furnishes some of the
material used by the contractor in constructing a partially completed building).
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for the proper discharge of the decree, the inability to gauge accurately
when the employee is performing to the best of his ability," 5 and the
inexpedience of compelling continued personal association after confidence and loyalty are gone116 have led the courts to consistently refuse
the relief of specific performance against the defaulting employee. Any
attempt to overcome these difficulties might involve too serious an infringment of personal liberty."17
The judicial choice of remedy has therefore become a complete
forfeiture, either of all of the benefit conferred by the employee, or that
amount which will compensate the employer for his damages. Of the
two, the majority of American courts have chosen the former. When
the non-defaulting employer initiates the action asking compensation for
breach damages, he has uniformly been required to account for the
value of part performance benefit received. Several writers, in law
review articles, have pointed out this difference in remedy depending
upon whether it is the defaulting employee or his non-defaulting employer who brings the action. This difference in remedies is claimed to
be a clear discrimination against the defaulting employee. The comparison is not sound, however, because the employer is not the breaching party. To draw a similar analogy the employer would (1) have to
be the defaulting party and (2) have conferred some benefit upon the
employee before breach. The issue would then be raised whether the
defaulting employer could prove the value of the benefit conferred and
recover the excess over damages caused to the employee by the breach,
on the basis of prevention of unjust enrichment. An appellate decision
invilving similar facts has not been located. It would only be in the case
where the employer is permitted by the courts to recover the excess
benefit that a discrimination between employer and employee could
properly be claimed.
Does the remedy proposed by-Britton v. Turner adequately protect
the non-defaulting employer? When the employer has obtained the
employee's labor valued in excess of provable damages, he clearly is
being enriched in that he has received value without paying for it.
However, whether the retention of this enrichment is unjust may in
part depend upon whom the burden of proof of damages is placed. The
fact that the employer cannot prove monetary loss does not mean that
he has not been damaged by the employee's abandonment of his promised performance. If nothing more, the employer has been inconvenienced. When the employer brings a damage action against the em15 3 WiLLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§830 and 1423A.
116 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §379, comment (d).

It should be noted that this
same reason of "forced continued incompatability" was used by the Indiana
court in Humphrey v.. Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 127 N.E. 819 (1920). The
defaulter was allowed the reasonable value of his care and support prior to
leaving.
217 Supra note 115, §1423A, notes 2, 3.
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ployee, his initiation of the suit is completely vountary."5 He evaluates
his position to determine whether or not his loss exceeds the benefit
received and whether or not he can establish this loss to the satisfaction
of the court. If he fails to prove his damages, he loses the benefit of
the employee's part performance; but it is an assumed risk, taken with
the belief that he can prove loss in excess of benefit thereby forcing the
employee to pay additional compensation. When the balance between
benefit and damages is small, or proof of damage is felt to be difficult,
the employer does not take the risk of litigation. The choice, however,
is his own. It is a voluntary decision. When, however, the defaulting
employee sues to recover the value of his part performance, Britton v.
Turner forces the employer to prove the amount of damage that he has
suffered by the breach or compensate for all of the service received.
The decision is not that of the employer but of the defaulting employee.
Some courts have tried to alleviate this problem by requiring the
employee to prove that there was a "net benefit" to the employer. Even
this term, however, has varied, with a Texas court holding that "the
value of the services would be determined by the usual rule, regardless
of whether or not they were of actual value of [the defendant]" ;119 on
the other hand, the Kansas court stated that "While the plaintiff proved
what his services were reasonably worth as a farm servant or farm
manager, there is no evidence to show what if any benefit these services
were worth to defendant.' 120 There is also an unjustness in this rule
requiring the employee to prove both benefit and damages. It is the
person injured who has better access to evidence of his damage, and the
burden should be upon him to prove that the injury is more, rather than
upon the employee to prove that it is less. Unfortunately the problem
of ultimate burden of proof in employment default cases is infrequently
discussed in the appellate decisions.1 21 The Restatement of Contracts requires the plaintiff to prove that there has been a "net profit" to the
defendant. 22 A compromise solution was suggested for New York by
their Law Revision Commission in 1942, proposing that the "net benefit
rule"'' 23 be used, but that where the services are designated by units or
I'8 Vancleave v. Clark, 118 Ind. 61, 20 N.E. 527 (1889) ; United Shoe Stores Co.
v. Dryer, 16 La. App. 605, 135 So. 50 (1931).
119 Hedges v. Slaughter, 130 S.W. 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
120 Fritts v. Quinton, 118 Kan. 111, 233 Pac. 1036 (1925).
122 See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §1124, p. 553.
122 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §357; See also N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (f) 1942, p.17.
at 36, 7.
123 ".. . Net benefit shall be determined by deducting from the amount of such
payment, or the value of the property transferred or delivered, the amount or
value of the benefits, if any, received by the defaulting party or a third party
beneficiary by reason of the contract, and the amount of damages to which
the other party is entitled by reason of the default ... ." "Of the difficulties
which stand in the way of the adoption of the doctrine of Britton v. Turner,
the measurement of the employer's benefit from the employee's part performance and the measure of the employer's damages are the principal ones."
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portions of 'services or periods of time of service as measuring the
compensation payable, the contract shall be deemed severable for the
purpose of giving the party performing one or more units or portions
of the service, or during one or more of such periods, a right to recover
on the contract the compensation so measured subject to the employer's
damage off-set.12 4 A "twenty per cent" proposal, although not adopted
by the New York Legislature,'2 5 has merit. The amount forfeited to the
employer is relatively small and yet large enough to eliminate frivolous
small claims for short term performance before adandonment by the
employee. It also establishes a presumption that the employer's damage
from the employee's quitting his employment is a minimum of one fifth
the value of total performance. There may be occasions when the employee can prove that the employer has not suffered any loss by the employee's quitting, and in this situation the twenty percent requirement
creates a penalty imposed upon the employee as pure punishment for
quitting. Many times, however, the employer has suffered intangible
loss because of the default, and the right to retain twenty percent of the
value conferred then serves as a protection to the employer who is ready
and willing to complete the contract. A comparative study of recent
legislation for the defaulting buyer of personal property reveals a 1952
statute in New York providing for forfeiture of twenty percent or
$500, whichever is less. Maryland lets the defaulting buyer regain up
to ninety percent of his payments, thus providing a ten percent penalty;
and the proposed Uniform Commercial Code proposes a twenty percent
maximum to the seller when there is a forfeiture clause within the sales
contract. Whether the twenty percent figure adopted in New York or
the ten percent of complete performance in the Maryland statute is
better is debatable; however, the matter of prime importance is that
these states have begun to use a compromise formula preventing complete forfeiture, and yet offering protection to the non-breaching party.
The problem of determining the value of intangible service is, of
course, greater than the monetary down payment in purchase default
contracts, but the evaluation is not any greater than many others that
juries must consider every day. It is regretted that the New York legislature did not adopt Professor Patterson's recommendation in 1942.
7) The Social Reasons (a) GreaterResponsibility of the Employer;
(b) Extension of Credit; (c) Custom: Williston has declared that the
124 Restitution for Benefit Conferred by a Party in Default Under a Contract,
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (f) 1942; proposed section 242. "In an action or
counterclaim the party seeking restitution for such net benefit shall have the
burden of proving the amount thereof."
125 Although this recommendation in 1942 involving the defaulting employee was
not adopted by the New York legislature, that legislature has, as of 1952,
adopted a Law Revision Committee recommendation allowing the defaulting
buyer of goods to recover his part performance in excess of twenty percent
of contract value or $$500, whichever is less.
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employer's normally greater responsibility, coupled with the inability to
obtain specific performance of the contract against the employee, justifies the present existence of the majority rule disallowing any recovery
to the employee who quits his employment. 126 Credit must be extended
when performance and payment cannot be simultaneous. Whether the
employee should extend credit for his work or the employer by advance
piyment is now clearly decided to the advantage of the employer. However, during the formulative period of the nineteenth century, the employer not only assumed greater general responsibility, but also financial
responsibility as a class. It was customary for the employer to extend
board and lodging as the work progressed. To this extent the employer
extended credit to the laborer. It has been suggested, therefore, that
the custom during the early eighteenth'century would have logically led
to the supposition that custom would generally be in favor of general
extension of credit by the employer. 12 7 The extension of credit by the
employer in the form of board and lodging, however, was necessary
and, therefore, became the custom, just as today it is sometimes customary for the seed company or the owner of the land to extend planting
seed to the lessee or sharecropper as credit until harvest time. Lack of
assets by the sharecropper requires this custom today just as it did for
the laborer at that time. The laborer however did not need his wages
paid in advance in order to perform the tasks of employment, and therefore this custom never arose. The advantageous economic position of
the employer prevented the employee from acquiring it through process
of bargain.
The practice requiring the worker to extend credit to his employer
in the form of completed labor has been said to be based upon the usual
practice of the community,' and the Restatement of Contracts comments that this practice became settled "Centuries ago.' 29 Yet, Justice
Parker in writing the Britton v. Turner decision in 1834 placed his decision partly upon the ground that "there is abundant reason to believe
that the general understanding of the community is that the hired
laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the services actually performed." Little evidence has been found to substantiate Parker's statement as to community attitude during the early nineteenth century.
There is abundant evidence that the judicial attitude of that time dis126 Supra note 115, §830, p. 2323.
127 McGowan, Divisibility of Employment Contracts, 21 IowA L. REV. 50, 69;
GRisMoRE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §136, p. 200 (1947). The

same factor of furnishing board and lodging, however, reduced the amount

of monetary compensation that the defaulting employee forfeited and therefore cushioned some of the effect of the employee's default. The custom of
furnishing board and lodging passed, but the strict rule against the default-

ing employee remained. See supra note 123, p. 33.
Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COL. L. REv. 903, 919
(1942).
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §270, comment (a).

128 Patterson,
126
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agreed wih Parker; and if there had been widespread divergence of
view between community custom and law, it would probably have been
revealed within the tenor of judicial opinion. The law of quasi-contract
had not developed as a separate classification in 1834, and it was not
until Keener's book in 1893 that the first attempt was made to unify the
various aspects of quasi-contract as a separate body of law. In addition,
the general law of employer-employee relation was less favorable to the
employee during the nineteenth century than it is today. This is evidenced by the later development of doctrines of assumption of risk and
the fellow-servant rule.130
8) "'Wilfulness" of the Employee's Breach: The reason most frequently advanced for denying relief to the defaulting employee is that
he "wilfully" breached his contract. The decisions have yielded few
definitions, and less discussion, for determining whether the given acts
constitute wilfulness. The matter has generally resided with the court's
discretion in considering the facts of each case. The term "wilful" has
been used to deny recovery when under the given facts it could only be
defined as the intentional exercise of the employee's free will. Thus,
relief has been denied to the employee who "voluntarily" quit because
of physical disability, 13' because his wife was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy and required his attention,' 3 2 because the employer, without
shift
justification, required the employee-husband to change to the night
33
Still
while his wife was forced to continue working the day shift.
other examples include a dockworker who terminated work because of
threat of physical injury by striking fellow-workers,' 3 4 a case wherein
fire destroyed part of the employer's law library and the employee-clerk
thereafter felt it was impossible to complete his agreement to copy the
laws of the state,135 the employee who "resigned" when his employer
requested him to sign false financial statements. 36 Nor has the definition of wilfulness of the breach been affected by the amount of the contract completed at the time the employee "voluntarily" left the employment. All relief was denied to the employee who had worked 27 days
out of a contract for one month,' 37 and again where he had completed
o30
Restitution for Benefit Conferred by a Party in Default Under a Contract.
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65 (f) 1942, p. 33.
'31Margoris v. United States Railroad Admin., 187 Iowa 605, 174 N.W. 371

(1919).

132 Jennings v. Lyons, 39 Wis. 553 (1876). Husband held to have "abandoned"

work because he should have forseen the wife's advanced pregnancy condition.
133 Sullivan v. Boeing Aircraft Co., 187 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1948): "We do not consi'der the inconveniences sufficient to outweigh the necessities of production
requirements under the circumstances presented here."

1 Walsh v. Esher, 102 Wis. 172, 78 N.W. 437 (1899).
135 Martin v. Massie, 127 Ala. 504, 29 So. 31 (1900).

136 Posey v. R. G. Hill & Co., 218 Ky. 543, 291 S.W. 773 (1927).
'3

Frati v. Jannini, 226 Mass. 430, 115 N.E. 746 (1917).
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28 days out of the 30 day contract. 138 A comparison with the building
construction contract reveals a greater tendency to allow relief under
comparable degree of performance where the facts reveal "good faith"
performance.
The courts have consistenty drawn a distinction between abandoned
performance and negligence. If the employee attempts to complete his
contract, but the work is improperly done because of his inability or
negligence, he is usually allowed to recover on contract less damages. If
risk of outside events which affect the employee's decision to continue
control the "wilfulness" of his breach, should the employee also assume
the risk that he possesses the skill to properly carry out his promise of
performance? As Justice Clark recently commented, "Here the libellant's default was based on his conclusion-apparently sound-that his
harried night estimates were improvident. Is that business judgment
wilful, whereas had he merely stalled completion or otherwise been unbusinesslike, he would have been only negligent? I endorse Professor
Corbin's view that we ought to reject these emotional grounds of de"139
cision .
On the other hand, Professor Patterson rightly points out that the
effect of Britton v. Turner is to completely disregard the cause of
breach. "The employee who quits without warning for the malicious
purpose of disrupting his employer's business would pay no more
damages than an employee who quits for any other reason short of legal
justification. 1 4 0 It is clear that an indiscriminate disregard of the cause
of default may be as unwarranted as the automatic denial of any relief
on grounds of "wilful" breach. Most American decisions have allowed
recovery to the employee who is discharged for cause; and yet some
courts, typified by New York decisions, have drawn a distinction when
the reason for discharge is malum in se. If the act is malicious with
intent to do harm to the employer, then perhaps the employee's part
performance interest should be completely forfeited regardless of the
issue of employer's enrichment. The basis for such decisions, however,
should be punishment of the employee for the nature of his breach. A
penalty is being imposed and should be clearly stated as the basis of the
judicial decision. When "wilfulness" is defined in this manner, within
Daly v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 98 S.C. 222, 82 S.E. 412 (1914).
1 Harris v. The Cecil N. Bean, 197 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1952). Concurring Opinion
by Judge Clark. Judge Chase seems to place the burden of proving the breach
to be non-wilful upon the defaulting employee. Cf. "Except for the attempted
justification for his default, based on the claim that he had been required to
do more work than called for in the specifications, which the commissioner and
the court rejected, the only reason given for the breach was that contained in
the letter to the claimant. That shows a wilful default made without regard
for the obligation imposed by the contract into which he had entered . .. ."
(The employee's default seems to be assumed to be wilful until proven by the
employee to be otherwise.)
138

14 Supra note 130, p. 39.
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the abandoned performance cases, the use of the term may be justified.
A distinction, therefore, should be drawn between the use of the term
"wilful" as applied in the above situations, *14 and its use in cases such as
those where the employee intentionally deceived the employer as to the
expenses incurred by him in operating the employer's farm ;142 where
the employee left during the height of the fall sales season to compete
with his former employer by organizing a new company;143 or where
the employee persistently and intentionally violated a provision of the
contract whereby he agreed not to solicit applications for burial policies
for other burial associations during the life of the contract.1 44 Malice
within the act rather than its voluntary nature justifies the forfeiture of
the employee's part performance. Complete forfeiture as opposed to
breach damages must have a justifiable purpose; and, although it is still
necessary to evaluate the facts of each case, a standard that recognizes
the punitive nature of the strict forfeiture rule should be applied by the
courts.
VIII. LAw OF ENGLAND

There are indications that as early as 1431 failure to complete an
entire contract of service resulted in the loss of the value of all work
performed. 1 45 This attitude was reaffirmed in 1470.146 Not until 1688,
however, was it clearly established that the service-employment contract
being entire, there could be no recovery for the completed part performance. In that year, in the Plymouth z. Throgmorton 47 decision,
Throgmorton had been appointed receiver of rents for one year at a
salary of £100, and after three quarters of the year his employer died.
In an action of debt against the executor of the employer's. estate, ,it
was held by the court of Kings Bench in error from the Court of Common Pleas that the employee not only could not collect £75 for threefourths of the year's salary, but was entitled to no payment because the
contract was entire and had not been fully performed.
This seventeenth century case, and the paramount case of the eighteenth century, Cutler v. Powell,14 involved death rather than abandonSee notes 131-138 supra.
Sipley v. Stickney, 190 Mass. 43, 76 N.E. 226 (1906).
143 Goodkind v. Steinberg Bros. & Kriptzer, 94 Misc. 197, 158 N.Y.S. 172 (1916).
144 National Burial Assn. v. Wright, 21 So.2d 589 (Miss. 1945). In re Woodworth,
15 F. Supp. 291 (D.C.N.Y. 1936), 85 F.2d 50 (1936). Perhaps the same view
should be taken to the attorney -who demanded additional compensation to
complete his contract for legal services because "he was confronted with
more work than he had contemplated." See Woodbury v. Jergens Co., 61 F.2d
736 (2d Cir. 1932).
145y.B.M. 10H 6, 23a pl. 78 (1431); Brooke Labourers 48; cf. Brooke Apporcionement 22. See Glanville Williams, Partial Performance of Entire
Contracts, 57 L.Q.R. 372, 375.
146 Y.B.M. 10E, 4, (49H, 6) 18b, pl. 22 (Brooke Apporcionement 13) ; Supra note
145, Williams p. 376.
'14 3 Mod. Rep. 153 (1688).
148 6 Term Rep. 320, 101 Eng. Rep. 573 (1795).
141
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ment of performance as the cause of the employee's failure to complete
his contract. Both, however, were significant in demonstrating the attitude of the English courts regarding performance of entire contracts.
Lord Kenyon based his decision in Cutler v. Powell upon two precepts:
first, when contracting parties have come to an express agreement, none
can thereafter be implied as long as the express contract exists; second,
that the specific case involved an aleatory contract. The seaman had
stipulated for a larger sum than ordinarily paid, based upon the understanding that payment would be conditioned upon completed performance. As has been shown, however, the decision has been cited in England
and America as authority for disallowing relief in service contract cases
that did not involve an aleatory factor. 149 The contract was entire, the
seaman assumed the risk of non-performance, and completion was condition precedent to payment. Wilfulness, fault or breach causation were
not involved. As Lord Ashurst commented in his opinion, "the seaman
was not indeed to blame for not doing it, but still as this was a condition
precedent and as he did not perform it, his representative is not entitled
to recover." It was not "wilfulness" but "condition precedent" that
controlled the decision in 1795.
The earliest English case in which the employee abandoned performance and attempted to collect for part performance is Huttman v.
Boulinois decided in 1826.50 Lord Abbott refused to grant any relief;
but at a rehearing, a partial payment of £15 was awarded and Lord
Tenterden advised the employee, "As you must admit the defendant has
a right to bring a cross action, would it not be better to take £15 without
costs upon the understanding that no cross action shall be brought."
This proposition was acceded to.
The primary litigation in England regarding the partial performance
interest of the abandoning employee fall within a short span of six
years, between 1874 and 1880. During this short period the cases of
Walsh v. Walley, Saunders v. Whittle, Gregson v. Watson and Warburton v. Heyworth were adjudicated. By 1874, it had become common
practice within the English weaving mills to compute on a specified day
in the middle of the week the amount earned by the weavers during the
previous week, but payment was not made until the following week-end.
In the Walsh case the weaveixs' wages were computed on Thursday, to
be paid on Saturday. The employee quit without notice on Friday afternoon. Recovery for the work performed between Thursday and Friday
afternoon was refused by Lord Cockburn because (irrespective of a
49 Supra note 41.
C. & P. 510, 172 Eng. Rep: 231 (1826). As his reasons for quitting, the em-

1502

ployee wrote the following letter of resignation to his employer. "So many
things stare me in the face which are undone and so many difficulties do I
anticipate, which I am quite unable to accomplish that I am in some measure

bewildered by the thoughts of them, and unable to perform those duties
which require immediate attention."
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forfeiture clause) "the wages of the current week would have been
forfeited under the general law."'-'
In both the Gregson and Warburton cases the factory worker was a
woman. In 1875, the Employers' and Workmen's Act had been
passed.1 52 Section 4 of this act protected women and children workers
against forfeitures, and section 11 gave children, young persons and
women subject to the provisions of the Factory Acts of 1833 to 1874,
the right upon terminating their employment to recover the value of
their executed performance then due that exceeds damages resulting
from the breach. The Gregson v. Watson"5' case arose in 1876 immediately following the passage of the above Act. Justice Cleasby, placing
emphasis upon the word "due" within section 11 of the Act, found nothing due for the work performed since the date of the last accounting;
and thus the value of this work was forfeited by quitting. The Warburton v. Heyworth decision, still relying upon the distinction between
performed work and accrued debt, found that the employee's wages became due at the time of booking at Wednesday noon rather than at 3
P.M. Wednesday afternoon when the work week ended. The employee
was thereby allowed to recover the amount booked, and the forfeiture
clause in her employment contract did not apply to this performance.14
The Saunders case' 5 5 also decided by Justice Cleasby in 1876 involved a painter hired by the week. Offended at his employer's criticism
of his work, he quit in the middle of the week. The court, in refusing
recovery for the portion of the week completed, pointed out that the
Button v.Thompson decision allowed recovery only for accrued wages
and that Cutler v. Powell still applied so that the employee had no right
to recover the value of labor performed for which an indebtedness had
not accrued. The development of the judicial pattern in the 1870's
based upon the "factory weaver" cases clearly established the trend in
England in employment default cases. The employee who resigns after
part performance is not entitled to recover for services performed unless the wages have accrued and are due prior to default. The work
performed between accrual date and termination date is forfeited.15 8
15

Walsh v. Walley, 9 Q.B. 367; 34 Digest 94, 692 (1874). The employee also

lost his compensation for the work done before Thursday because of the
forfeiture clause which provided "failure to give fourteen days notice before
quitting will forfeit all wages due."
152 Employers and Workmen Act of 1875, Statute 38 and 39 Vict. ch. 90. Sec. 11:
"In the case of a child, young person, or woman subject to the provisions of
the Factory Acts of 1833 to 1874, any forfeiture on the ground of absence or
leaving work, shall not be deducted from or offset against a claim for wages
or other sum due for work done, before such absence or leaving work, except to the amount of damages (if any) which the employer may have sustained by reason of such absence or leaving work"
153 34 L.T. 143, 34 Digest 94, 695 (1876).
154 6 Q.B.D. 1 (1880).
'55 Saunders v. Whittle, 33 L.T. 816 (1876).
158

In the absence of a provision forfeiting wages, the master remains liable,
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Implied contracts in the non-consensual sense have passed through
two stages in the law of England. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, during the period of development, its range was ever expanding; but since the middle of the nineteenth century, the pendulum has
swung, the common law courts restricting the remedy.157 It has been of
only very recent date that the English courts have entered a third phase
of gradual expansion. 158 The strict use of the forms of action in England prevented the separate classification by English writers of agreements implied in law until the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Leake's Law of Contracts in 1857 was the first text to establish a third
classification, which has become our modern day quasi-contract obligation. 59
IX. LAw OF CANADA

The problem of the employee's right to recover for part performance prior to default did not arise in Canada until the beginning of the
twentieth century. Most of the cases reaching the appellate level involved farm labor In 1903, an unusually harsh decision was rendered
in the Quebec province, the court holding that the employee who quit
not only forfeited his right to wages for the work completed, but in addition the employer was permitted recovery on his cross action for
damages ensuing from the breach. 60 The employer recovered double
and the employee paid twice, in labor and again in monetary damages.
There can be little question that the intent of such decision is deliberate
punishment for breach of legal promise.
In Farrow v. Gardner'6 ' a farm laborer quit at the end of three
months because his employer had failed to furnish a previously promised house and had paid only one of three month's salary. The court in
1913 ruled that the employer had not repudiated the contract by omitnotwithstanding the servant's breach of contract, to pay him any wages already

accrued, due and remaining unpaid at the date of the breach, since the serv-

ant's right to payment is not affected by the subsequent breach. See following
cases so holding: Button v. Thompson [1869] L.R. 4 C.P. 330; 34 Digest 90,
665; Margerison v. Bextwistle [1872] 36 J.P. 100; Warburton v. Heyworth
[1880] 6 Q.B.D. 1 (C.A.) ; 34 Digest 93, 693; Parkin v. South Hetton Coal Co.
[19071 24 T.L.R. 193, 98 L.T. 162, 34 Digest 91, 667; George v. Davies [1911]
2 K.B. 445, 34 Digest 66, 432.
157 See Morgan v. Ashcroft [1938] 1 K.B. 49. Justice Scott, at p. 75: "There is
no doubt that the moral principle of "unjust enrichment" to which he [Ames]
refers and which is recognized in some systems of law as a definite legal
principle, and indeed underlay Lord Mansfield's famous dictum in Moses v.
Macfarlan, 2 Burr. 1005, in the year 1760 has now been rejected by English
courts as a universal or complete legal touchstone whereby to test this
cause of action."
158 Within the field of impossibility of performance and frustrated contracts, see
Fibrosa Spokla Akcvina v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd. [1943]
A.C. 32, 2 All Eng. 122 (1942); and WILLIAMS, LAW REFORM (FRUSTRATEI)
CONTRACTS) ACT, 1943 (1944) for recent English change.
159 Winfield, Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance, 55 L.Q.R. 499, 500 (1939).
160 McKee v. C.P.R. [1903] 23 C.L.T. 121 (Que.).
161 [1913] 24 W.L.R. 929, 12 D.L.R. 843 (B.C.).
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ting to pay wages at the time agreed or to furnish the promised house
for plaintiff, inasmuch as the defendant had requested the plaintiff to
continue in his service, promising to pay the wage arrears in a few
days. The employee's departure under such circumstances, without giving a month's notice, created a voluntary breach of contract and forfeited the unpaid wages. Two years later, a farm employee, in La Pante
v. Kinnon,162 hired for the season, quit because of a misunderstanding
as to the amount of wages he was to receive during the harvest time.
Relief was again denied.
Finally two cases were decided in 1917, the first in Saskatchewan,106
involving a contract for farm labor by husband and wife, with the
agreement that most of their pay for the eight months would be withheld until the end of the season. The wife became ill, and some of the
withheld compensation was needed. The employer refused to release
any of the money covering the period of completed service whereupon
the husband and wife left. The court found that the employees were
not justified in quitting and referred to the La Plante decision in denying the claim. In the second case, a fisherman deserted his ship when it
had to be returned for temporary repairs. 16 4 Relief for part performance over damages was again denied based on the English decision,
Boston Deep Sea Fishing Co. v. Ansell.165
The earlier judicial development in the United States and England
has therefore been applied uniformly in Canadian adjudications.
Alberta by statute 68 has attempted to penalize equally the delinquent
employer as well as the employee for breach of contract, but compensation over damages is not granted to the defaulter.
This same judicial approach to the problem has been taken in other
parts of the British Empire, with decisions denying any recovery in
South Africa, 167 and India. 6s Mexico imposes the same severe penalty
upon the defaulting employee as the initial Canadian case of 1903. The
employee dare not default in performance because he subjects himself
69
to monetary damages as well as loss of completed performance.
To
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[19151 21 D.L.R. 293, 8 S.L.R. 25.
Neville v. MacDonald [1917] 3 W.W.R. 240, 10 Sask. L.R. 284, 36 D.L.R. 594.
114 Selig v. Arenburg [1917] 51 N.S.R. 198; 35 D.L.R. 608; See also Kennedy v.
Royce, 31 O.W.N. 266 (C.A.) (obiter dicta, as suit was brought on a contract).
165 Boston Deep Sea Fishing Co. v. Ansell, 39 Ch. D. 339, 364.
166 Alberta Rev. Stat. (1922) ch. 180, see Laube, The Defaulting EmployeeBritton v. Turner Reviewed, 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 825, 844.
167 Bassaramadoo v. Morris, 6 S.C. 28 (1888); Robertson & Co. v. Heathorn, 21
S.C. 427 (1904).
168 Dhumee Behara v. Stevenoaks [1836] I.L.R., 13 Calc. 8o; Ralli Brothers v.
Arbica Prasad [1912] I.L.R. 35 All. E. 132.
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